seemed to have for Pickering. Now, true to his 'metaphysical turn', he devotes most of his Response to this example, although it takes less than two pages out of sixteen in my Review. Though I used that example, as well as Otto Sibum's reconstitution of Joules' experiment, to talk about the problem of the persistence of entities in time, which makes Pickering's concept of emergence problematic, his comments are limited to repeating that things really emerge in time. Thus he tells us that before Glaser embarked upon his project, 'there were no bubble chambers anywhere' [AP, 308] . Of course there were none, but the point here is that, as I wrote in my Review, Pickering again confuses machines, which are composed objects, and entities, which are not composed; they thus 'have a distinct ontological status' [YG, 326] . And to make things even more complete, I added [YG, 333, note 12] that 'effects' like Hall or Zeeman effects also had a different ontological status, only to make clear that if one wants to talk about ontology one should take these differences seriously, or at least argue against them. This I take to be the kind of confusion that makes Pickering's 'metaphysics' superficial. But in his Response, Pickering chose not to raise (or to grasp?) those questions, preferring to repeat the obvious: the bubble chamber did not exist before Glaser, and here is a proof that things emerge in time . . . . Section four took up the question of Pickering's 'theory of everything' (TOE). Far from a simple 'mockery' [AP, 310, note 2], this section took seriously Pickering's writing about 'cabalos, virinculi, montani', and other demons [MP, 243] . By the way, I must note that in the reviews I have seen of The Mangle, no-one seems to have taken that part seriously: reviewers, curiously, simply pass over in silence on the concept of 'non-standard agency'. As a firm believer in argumentation and in charitable interpretations, I choose to look at the consequences of what seems at first sight to be a 'non-standard analysis' in the sociology of science. But to be complete on that topic, I should have added that for the blind man of my example, if things happened to move around him in curious ways, he would probably attribute that to a playful friend playing tricks on him, before thinking about ghosts, or any other non-standard agency . . . . In all cases, however, he would apply the principle of sufficient reason: nothing happens without a reason. And I am ready to bet on this anthropological description of what he would do! The other comment I made on Pickering's TOE was, I think, also important, but was somehow made difficult to read. I thus take the present opportunity to correct a sentence that contained two important typos that made it incomprehensible. I noted that by making his concepts applicable to everything, he was falling into an old trap described long ago by Aristotle, that 'there is an inverse relation between the extension and the intension of a concept' [YG, 326] -or, in less philosophical terms, a notion applicable to everything is empty. But on this Pickering has nothing to say.
Section five discussed what I saw as a 'spontaneous breaking of symmetry' in Pickering's treatment of humans and non-humans. On the one hand, he writes that since he cannot attribute goals to non-humans, while he cannot make sense of scientific practice 'without reference to the intentions of scientists', the symmetry between humans and non-humans 'appears to break down' [MP, 17] . In his Response, Pickering criticizes me for effecting a 'clean split between the human and the non-human' [AP, 309] . Now, as any reader can see, it is Pickering himself in his book who 'effects a clean split' in giving intentions to scientists and refusing them to objects which only react to human actions. My blind-man example took that assymetry into account, so it is no surprise that it is not symmetrical. By saying that my story of the blind man 'invites us to think about how we humans individually or collectively come to terms with a dead and uninteresting material world' [AP, 309, emphasis added], Pickering is nearly right -except that the little particle 'and' is here again creating confusion by amalgamation: dead yes, but uninteresting no; objects are dead (excluding the living ones of course, which are not treated by Pickering) but very interesting for scientists, as well as for historians and sociologists of science. Instead of commenting on my being 'traditional' (curiously not seeing its ironical tone), Pickering could have used space to explain why he is in fact not symmetrical in his descriptions of actions, and why symmetry should be expected a priori. Clearly, my comments meant that I was willing to be enlightened on that apparent contradiction in the book: but, despite the clear title of that section of my Review, Pickering does not seem to have grasped the problem. 3 This brings us to the section on individualistic history, which suggested, again on the very basis of Pickering's descriptions of events, that compared to the original analysis of the bubble chamber and N/C technology provided respectively by Peter Galison and David Noble, Pickering's treatment was turgid in style and fundamentally based on a very individualistic treatment of action, which goes so far as stating (as, again, I noted in my Review) that 'scientific objectivity can be located already at the level of individual practice . . . prior to any social ratification' [MP, 196] . I then noted that this view is hardly compatible with Pickering's self-professed pragmatism [YG, 330] , but that does not seem to be a problem important enough to be raised in his Response. When looked at from the point of view of the general structure of the narratives proposed, it is plain that everything in them is like a ping-pong game, be it between Morpurgo and his apparatus, Glaser and his bubble chamber, or even between workers and management. And it is significant that, as I noted in my Review, Pickering admits that he could indeed have told the story of Morpurgo along the same lines as he told the story of Glaser [MP, [72] [73] . The problem was not the absence of macrosociological actors, but the fact that they are all treated similarly in a simple diadic relationship. But only a detailed comparative treatment of the different narratives could show that convincingly, and the examples provided in my Review simply pointed the reader in the right direction, so that s/he could easily find others.
We finally come to the last section, on resistance and constraint. Here the point is not the inability to 'imagine any alternative to . . . constraint other than "total freedom" ' [AP, 311, note 8], but to see how Pickering manages in his book to provide any alternative. It is true that he has 'nowhere stated that contingency is all there is' [AP, ibid.], but the book clearly insists (like a mantra) that 'things just happened', and the only concept used to limit total freedom is of course the 'resistance' of the objects. But as I suggested in my Review with the example of Mozart [YG, 331] , there are often social structures that play an important rôle in limiting possible actions. But here again, Pickering chose not to raise these questions.
Pickering may be right that 'the better arguments do not always win the day' [AP, 310], but they certainly have more chance of doing so when their presentation is not too mangled and, above all, when their author takes the time to answer competing arguments point by point by paying attention to their precise formulation, instead of simply stating that the original arguments were 'hard to grasp'. But this is not an easy task when one is contemplating one's own oeuvre from the top of a mountain, while looking down on those who tediously try to make sense of the bits and pieces of arguments collected in a book and who, finding them wanting, simply point to inadequacies, ready to be enlightened in their valley of the blind.
Notes

